I never intended to advocate for reform of California’s civil justice system. I became one after my attorney and I parted ways over what he described in two words: “communication breakdown.”

I tried to retain replacement counsel. Responses ranged from conflicts of interest to “I’m not taking new cases,” but none agreed. I cannot establish a broader pattern, yet my experience suggests that ongoing cases can be extraordinarily difficult to place after an attorney-client relationship ends. For stranded litigants, self-representation may be the only way to defend themselves.

Self-represented litigants in California are expected to follow procedural rules as attorneys do. But if they shoulder comparable responsibilities, do they receive comparable protections?

On July 8, here in the Truckee branch of Nevada County Superior Court, a discovery motion against me was granted because I had not filed a written opposition. I was ordered to pay $4,000 toward the opposing party’s attorney fees.

I did not oppose discovery itself. I objected to requests I believed were overly broad and burdensome in scope.

I later sought relief under Code of Civil Procedure §473(b), acknowledged my mistake and submitted the objections I had intended to file. The court denied relief. When I returned to the scope issue, I was specifically told that I could not object.

The court did not expressly say I would have had no right to object had I filed properly. But that was the implication I was left with—even though California discovery procedure provides a mechanism for objections.

That leaves a contradiction: If self-represented litigants must follow the same procedures as lawyers, shouldn’t they also be allowed to use the protections those procedures provide?

Section 473(b) contains another disparity. When an attorney submits the required sworn affidavit, a court must vacate certain defaults, default judgments or dismissals caused by that attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect.

A self-represented litigant cannot invoke that mandatory protection. There is no attorney to blame. The litigant must rely on discretionary relief.

Sanctions can be necessary to enforce discovery obligations. But consider what happens when the positions are reversed.

If a party improperly refuses discovery, hours spent by opposing counsel generate a bill that may support a sanctions request. A self-represented litigant may spend the same hours researching law, drafting motions and appearing in court. But there is no attorney bill.

That same day, the California Court of Appeal issued its decision in Damak v. Superior Court. The court reaffirmed that expense-based discovery sanctions generally do not compensate self-represented litigants for their own time. It acknowledged the “seeming injustice,” although it identified a separate $1,000 sanction for certain document-production misconduct.

The system can say: You must understand and follow the rules. If your conduct causes the other side’s lawyer unnecessary work, you may have to pay for that lawyer’s time.

But when another party’s conduct causes you unnecessary legal work, your time generally has no compensable value.

Sanctions are intended to deter misconduct. But in practice, their threat can become a weapon against self-represented litigants—one that discourages legitimate self-defense. Someone without counsel may abandon a good-faith objection, not because it lacks merit, but because losing could mean paying thousands of dollars for opposing counsel’s time.

I believe the denial of relief was legally wrong and intend to seek appellate review. The appellate court may agree with me. It may not.

Self-represented litigants should not be excused for every mistake. Attorneys’ specialized training and professional obligations are real.

But should access to meaningful remedies and procedural protections turn on whether you can afford—or are able—to hire someone else to perform the legal work?

That question is especially important in family court. Estimates vary, but sources report that 70% to 90% of family law cases involve at least one self-represented litigant. This is not a problem at the margins. It affects the majority of families who enter the system.

Whether these asymmetries present a constitutional Equal Protection problem deserves legal examination. My experience cannot answer that question. But constitutional or not, California should confront the public-policy issue.

Equal justice cannot simply mean equal responsibility.

If California expects citizens representing themselves to navigate its legal system correctly, its remedies and protections should operate fairly for them as well.

This is larger than my divorce. If my experience can expose a weakness and help make the courthouse fairer for the next self-represented person, it is a conversation worth having.

Author’s Note: Gregg Stefanelli is a 35-year Truckee resident, emeritus faculty member at the University of Nevada, Reno, technology executive, and advocate for the fair treatment of self-represented litigants.